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Abstract. The Hierarchical Optimized Link State Routing (HOLSR) protocol
enhances the scalability and heterogeneity of traditional OLSR-basedMobile Ad-
Hoc Networks (MANETs). It organizes the network in logical levels and nodes
in clusters. In every cluster, it implements the mechanisms and algorithms of the
original OLSR to generate and to distribute control traffic information. However,
the HOLSR protocol was designed with no security in mind. Indeed, it both in-
herits, from OLSR, and adds new security threats. For instance, the existence
of misbehaving nodes can highly affect important HOLSR operations, such as
the cluster formation. Cluster IDentification (CID) messages are implemented to
organize a HOLSR network in clusters. In every message, the hop count field
indicates to the receiver the distance in hops to the originator. An attacker may
maliciously alter the hop count field. As a consequence, a receiver node may join
a cluster head farther away than it appears. Then, the scalability properties in a
HOLSR network is affected by an unbalanced distribution of nodes per cluster.
We present a solution based on the use of hash chains to protect mutable fields in
CID messages. As a consequence, when a misbehaving node alters the hop count
field in a CID message, the receiver nodes are able of detecting and discarding
the invalid message.
Keywords: MANETs, Routing, HOLSR, Security, Hash Chains.
1 Introduction
The Hierarchical Optimized Link State Routing (HOLSR) [14] is a proactive routing
protocol designed to improve scalability of heterogeneous Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(MANETs). HOLSR has two phases: i) cluster formation and ii) topology map acqui-
sition. In the first phase, HOLSR organizes the network in logical levels and nodes in
clusters. In the second phase, HOLSR implements the mechanisms and algorithms of
the original OLSR [4] to generate and to distribute control traffic messages. Information
contained in Hello and Topology Control (TC) messages are used to calculate optimal
routes from any given node to any destination within each cluster. Additionally, Hier-
archical Topology Control (HTC) messages are implemented to advertise membership
information from a cluster to other nodes in higher levels. Nevertheless, HOLSR was
designed without security measures. Therefore, both phases are vulnerable to malicious
attacks. In HOLSR networks, a malicious attack can be perpetrated by a node that in-
terrupts the flooding of control traffic information or does not obey the rules of the
protocol to maintain the hierarchical architecture. In this paper, we describe a cluster
formation attack against the HOLSR protocol during the cluster formation phase.
During the first stage, every cluster head advertises itself through the periodical
generation of CID messages that invite other nodes to join. Every CID message has a
hop count field that indicates the distance to the originator. The cluster head field of a
CID messages points to the originator. When the receiver node joins a cluster head, it
generates a new message increasing by one the hop count field. When a node receives
messages from different cluster heads, it joins the closest cluster head, in terms of hops.
When a node receives CID messages from multiple cluster heads, but with the same
hop count, it attaches itself to the cluster head from which it received the first message
and remains with that cluster head until the topology changes. As a consequence, a
node at the border of different clusters only accepts control traffic information from
its cluster. An attacker might unsettle this process by generating CID messages with
and invalid hop count field. This attack, has a higher impact when the hop count field
value is drastically reduced. The receiver nodes may join a cluster head which is farther
away than it appears. As a result, the affected cluster head may be overloaded due to an
unbalanced node distribution. Additionally, the nodes in some clusters have to include
more elements in their routing tables adding unnecessary overhead to the cluster. We
handle this risk by implementing a mechanism that implements hash chains to protect
the hop count field in every CID message. Our solution is based on the work of Hong et
al. in [6]. They present a wormhole detective mechanism and an authentication protocol
to strengthen the neighbor relationship establishment in standard OLSR. We address a
different kind of attack in HOLSR networks. Our mechanism protects the integrity of
CID messages and enforces the uniform distribution of nodes in every cluster.
Organization of the paper — Section 2 reviews the OLSR protocol. Section 3 presents
the HOLSR protocol. Section 4 describes the cluster formation attack. Section 5 presents
a new security extension to the protocol leveraging hash chains that mitigates the cluster
formation attack. Section 6, shows our results and simulations setup. Section 7 presents
the related work. Finally, Section 8 closes the paper with our conclusions.
2 Optimized Link State Routing Protocol
This section presents a brief overview of the OLSR protocol. OLSR is a proactive rout-
ing protocol designed for MANETs. The core of the protocol is the selection, by ev-
ery node, of Multipoint Relays (MPRs) among their one-hop symmetric neighbors.
OLSR nodes flood the network with link-state information messages. The link-state
information is constructed by every node and involves periodically sending Hello and
TC messages. This information is used to determine the best path to every destination
in the network. Due to the proactive nature, the routes are immediately available when
needed. The OLSR protocol is based on hop by hop routing, i.e., each routing table
lists, for each reachable destination, the address of the next node along the path to that
destination. To construct a topology map, every node implements a topology discov-
ery mechanism leveraging the periodic exchange of control traffic messages. Topology
discovery includes: link sensing, neighbor detection and topology sensing.
During this first stage (link sensing), every node populates its local link information
base (link set). This phase is exclusively concerned with the OLSR interface addresses
and ability to exchange packets between such OLSR interfaces. Then, during the neigh-
bor detection stage, every node populates its neighborhood information base (i.e., one-
hop and two-hop neighbor set). The link sensing and neighbor detection phases are
based on the periodic exchange of Hello messages. Hello messages are solely transmit-
ted to one-hop neighbors. Information contained in Hello messages allows every node
to construct and maintain neighbor tables, as well as to select its MPR set. The MPR
set is selected such that all two-hop neighbors are reachable through, at least, one MPR.
In the neighbor table, each node records the information about the one-hop neighbor
link status (i.e., unidirectional, bidirectional or MPR), with this information every node
builds its MPR selector set, i.e., the number of neighbors who selected that node as their
MPR.
Topology sensing is achieved through the exchange of TC messages. TC messages
are generated and retransmitted exclusively by the MPRs. These messages allow each
node to construct its topology table and to declare its MPR Selector set. The MPR
Selector Set is the collection of nodes that have selected a given node as an MPR. A
TC contains the MPR Selector Set of its originator. A node that has an empty MPR
Selector Set does not send or retransmit any TC message. An MPR forwards a message
if it comes from a node in its MPR Selector Set. This forwarding algorithm is defined
in [4]. Using the information from TC messages, each node maintains a topology table
where each entry consists of: (i) an identifier of a possible destination, i.e., an MPR
selector in a TC message, (ii) an identifier of a last-hop node to that destination, i.e.,
the originator of the TC message, and (iii) an MPR Selector Set sequence number [8].
It implies that a possible destination (i.e. an MPR selector) can be reached through the
originator of the TC message. If there is an entry in the topology table whose last-hop
address corresponds to the originator of a new TC message and the MPR Selector Set
sequence number is greater than the sequence number in the received message, then the
new message is discarded. Routing tables are constructed using the information from
the neighbor and topology table.
OLSR implements two optional messages: Multiple Interface Declaration (MID)
and Host and Network Association (HNA) messages. MID messages are used to de-
clare the presence of multiple interfaces on a node. HNA messages are employed to
inject external routing information into an OLSR network and provide connectivity to
nodes with non-OLSR interfaces. HNA and MID are exclusively retransmitted by the
MPRs and following the default forwarding algorithm defined in [4]. MID messages
are implemented in a network with multiple interface nodes. Additional information is
necessary in order to map interface addresses to main addresses. In OLSR, the main
address is defined as the OLSR interface address. A node with multiple interfaces must
generate periodically MID messages announcing all its interfaces to other nodes in the
network. Thus, every node in an OLSR network will associate multiple interfaces to
a node’s main address. Nodes with just one interface do not generate MID messages
and the main address is the OLSR interface address. A node with several interfaces,
where only one of them is participating in an OLSR network must not generate MID
messages. MID messages are retransmitted exclusively by the MPRs following the de-
fault forwarding algorithm . Upon receiving a MID message, the information is stored
in an Interface Association table. This information is used to construct the routing ta-
bles. Then, if a node misbehaves and does not retransmit MID messages, the proper
construction of the routing tables is compromised.
In an OLSR network, a node with multiple interfaces might be connected to an
external network (e.g., an Ethernet) not running OLSR. In this case, the node acts as
a gateway and may inject external routing information in the OLSR network. Thus,
a node connected to an external network should periodically generate HNA messages
announcing its external network address and netmask. HNAmessages flood the network
following the default MPR forwarding mechanism. The flooded information is used by
the OLSR nodes to construct their routing tables. HNAmessages can be considered as a
generalized version of the TC messages. Like TC messages, the originator of the HNA
messages announces reachability to the others.
3 The Hierarchical OLSR Protocol
OLSR is a flat routing protocol designed exclusively for MANETs. However, the
performance of the protocol tends to degrade when the number of nodes increases due
to a higher number of topology control messages propagated through the network. Scal-
ability can be defined as the capacity of the network to adjust and to maintain its perfor-
mance even when the number of nodes in the network increases [14]. The MPR mech-
anism is local and therefore very scalable. However, the diffusion by all the nodes in
the network of all the link-state information is less scalable. For instance, in [11] Palma
et. al. show that OLSR has good results in terms of scalability in networks with up to
70 nodes, preferably with a moderate node speed (e.g., pedestrian speed) and where the
number of traffic flows is also moderate. However, OLSR’s performance decreases in
large heterogeneous ad hoc networks.
Additionally, OLSR does not differentiate the capabilities of its member nodes and,
in consequence, does not exploit nodes with higher capabilities. Thus, HOLSR is an
approach designed to improve the scalability of OLSR protocol in large-scale hetero-
geneous networks. The main improvements are a reduction in the amount of topology
control traffic and efficient use of high capacity nodes. HOLSR organizes the network
in hierarchical clusters. This architecture allows to reduce the routing computational
cost, i.e., in case a link is broken only nodes inside the same cluster have to recalculate
their routing table while nodes in different clusters are not affected.
In HOLSR, nodes are organized in clusters according to their capacities. The net-
work hierarchical architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. At level 1, we have low-capability
nodes with one interface represented by circles. Nodes at the topology level 2 are
equipped with up to two wireless interfaces, designated by squares. Nodes at level 2
employ one interface to communicate with nodes at level 2 and one interface to com-
municate with nodes at level 1 or 3. Nodes at level 3, designated by triangles, represent
high-capacity nodes with up to three wireless interfaces to communicate with nodes
at lower levels. Nodes with more than one interface are selected as cluster heads. In
Fig. 1, the notation used to name the clusters reflects the level of the cluster and the
cluster head, e.g., C1.A means that the cluster is at level 1 and the cluster head is node
A. A node with multiple interfaces is identified at every level with a different inter-
face. For instance, in Fig. 1 node F has two interfaces and can communicate with nodes
at levels 2 and 3. Then, F2 and F3 represent node F’s interfaces at level 2 and 3 re-
spectively. Node B has three interfaces and establishes communication with nodes at
levels 1, 2 and 3 through interfaces B1, B2 and B3 respectively. HOLSR allows forma-
tion of multiple clusters and, unlike OLSR, HOLSR nodes can exchange Hello and TC
messages exclusively within each cluster. This constraint reduces the amount of traffic
information broadcast to the entire ad hoc network.
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Fig. 1. Example of a hierarchical architecture with heterogeneous nodes.
3.1 Cluster Formation
The topology control information is exchanged between clusters via specialized HOLSR
nodes designed as cluster heads. The selection of cluster heads and classification of
nodes according to their capabilities are defined at the startup of the HOLSR process.
A cluster is formed by a group of mobile nodes -at the same hierarchical level- that
have selected a common cluster head. Nodes can move from one cluster to another
and associate to a new cluster head. Any node participating in multiple topology levels
automatically becomes the cluster head of the lower-level cluster. In HOLSR, a clus-
ter head declares its status and invites other nodes to join it by periodically sending
out CID announcement messages. These messages are transmitted in the same packets
together with Hello messages using a message grouping technique. This technique is
implemented to reduce the number of packet transmissions. A CID message contains
two fields:
– cluster head: interface address of the originator of the message.
– hop count: distance in hops to the cluster head generating the message.
Once a node has joined a cluster head, it generates a new CID message inviting other
nodes farther away to join the cluster. Any given node may receive two or more CID
messages, indicating that it is located in the overlapping regions of multiple clusters. In
such a case, the node joins whichever cluster is closer in terms of hop count. When a
node receives messages from different cluster heads with the same hop count value, it
joins the cluster head from which it received the first CID message. Fig. 2 shows the
cluster formation process. Nodes A and B are cluster heads and generate CID messages
(CIDA andCIDB respectively). The one-hop neighbor nodes join the originator of the
message and generate a new message increasing by one the hop count field. Notice that
node 2 receives CID messages from CHA and CHB with the same hop count value. In
this case, node 2 chooses the cluster from which it has received the first message. In the
same figure, node 9 joins cluster head A and generates a new CID message with hop
count equal to four. Node 11 rejects that message because cluster head B is only three
hops away. We refer to neighbor nodes in different clusters, such as nodes 9 and 11,
as border nodes. Robustness is ensured thanks to a built-in diagnostic feature. Every
node registers a timeout value for each CID message received. When a cluster head be-
comes inactive or moves away, then each neighbor node stops receiving CID messages.
Eventually the CID message timeout expires and the CID information becomes invalid.
- Cluster Head
CID - Cluster ID advertisement
- CID Message CIDA: 2
CIDA: 1 
CIDA: 1 
CIDA: 1 
CIDA: 2
CIDA: 3
CIDA: 2
A 1
8
6
7
54
CIDA: 4
CIDB: 1 
CIDB: 2 
CIDB: 3 
2
9 11
B
CIDB: 4 
CIDB: 2 
CIDB: 1 
3
10
12
13
Fig. 2. CID messages.
Thus, each node starts to process new CID messages from other clusters and selects a
new cluster head. For instance, in Fig. 2, assuming cluster head CHA went down, then
all nodes attached to it will join cluster head CHB after receiving new CID messages
from that cluster head. If no CID messages are received, then it means that the network
is not partitioned in clusters anymore and behaves as the original OLSR protocol.
3.2 Cluster Head Message Exchange
The hierarchical architecture must support the exchange of topology control informa-
tion between clusters without introducing additional overhead. Thus, Hierarchical TC
(HTC) messages are generated by the cluster head and used to transmit the member-
ship information of a cluster to higher level nodes. There are three basic types of HTC
messages:
– full membership: these messages are periodically transmitted by a cluster head to
provide information about its cluster members, including any node in lower levels
beneath it.
– update: to provide information about cluster membership changes. The update HTC
is used when a node leaves or joins a cluster.
– request: request HTC messages are used when a packet loss has occurred. HTC
message carries a sequence number field, which allows a node to request the re-
transmission of a full membership HTC message.
HTC forwarding is enabled by the MPRs and restricted within a cluster. Nodes at the
highest topology level have full knowledge of all nodes in the network and their routing
tables are as large as they would be in an OLSR network. However, in lower levels,
the size of the routing table of every node is restricted to the size of the cluster and it
is smaller than in OLSR. For instance, in Fig. 1 the cluster head A generates an HTC
message for the interface A2 (level 2) announcing that nodes 1, 2 and A1 are members
of its cluster at level 1. The message is relayed to all nodes at the same level. Then, node
B generates an HTC message for the interface B3 (level 3) advertising that nodes 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 7, 8, A1, B1, C1 (at level 1) and A2, B2, C2, D2 (at level 2) are members of its
cluster. Fig. 3 presents a summary of the messages implemented in HOLSR networks.
Messages Generated by Retransmitted by Information reported
Hello Every node N/A One-hop neighbors
TC MPRs MPRs MPR selectors
CID Cluster heads N/A A Cluster head
HTC Cluster heads MPRs Nodes within a cluster
Fig. 3. Summary of control traffic messages in HOLSR networks.
3.3 Topology Control Propagation
Nodes in each cluster select their MPRs to flood control traffic information. Control
messages are generated and propagated exclusively within each cluster, unless a node
is located in the overlapping zone of several clusters. For example, in Fig. 1 node 2 is
within the border of cluster C1.A and may accept a TC or HTC message from node 3
located in cluster C1.B. However, node 2 retains the information without retransmitting
it to its cluster. Thus, except for the border nodes, knowledge of nodes about the clusters
is restricted to their own cluster. Data transfer between nodes in the same cluster is
achieved directly via the information in the routing tables. However, when transmitting
data to destinations outside the local scope of a cluster, the cluster heads is used as a
gateway. When transmitting data between border nodes in different clusters at the same
level, a different strategy might be used. In this situation, the cluster head is not used as
a gateway to relay the information. Nearby nodes in different clusters at the same level
can communicate directly without following the strict clustering hierarchy. This means
that, data transfer between nodes is achieved following three different strategies:
– communication between nodes in the same cluster is achieved via the routing in-
formation in their routing tables,
– data transfer between nodes in different clusters is achieved through the cluster
heads, but
– if the nodes are neighboring nodes in different clusters at the same topology level,
the cluster heads are not used and data packets are directly relayed.
Therefore, HOLSR offers two main advantages (a) messages reflecting local movement
are restricted to each cluster (thus, reducing the routing table computation overhead)
and (b) an efficient use of high-capacity nodes without overloading them.
4 Cluster Formation Attack against the HOLSR protocol
4.1 Adversary Model
The flow of CID messages is an important vulnerability target. The hop count has to
be updated every time a new message is retransmitted. Thus, a malicious node might
alter this field to unsettle the cluster formation process. The attack, has a bigger impact
when the malicious node drastically reduces the hop count field. This is because the
receiver nodes accept the CID message with the lowest hop count value. Thus, when
an attacker increases drastically the value, the receiver nodes automatically discard the
altered message and accept the valid message from other nodes, as this is described
in Section 3.1. If a node that generates a CID message reinitializes the value of the
field hop count, the receiver nodes may join a farther cluster head and discard valid
CID messages from closer cluster heads. Then, we only need to address the case when
the hop count field is maliciously reduced.
In general, if an attacker is at distance d (in hops) from a cluster head CHi, and
generates a new CID message with hop count value j, the nodes with hop count greater
or equal to j + d2 from the CHi are potentially affected. For instance, Fig. 4 (a) shows
the correct propagation of CID messages. Fig. 4 (b) shows an example of the attack.
In Fig. 4 (b), M1 is a malicious node at distance six hops from cluster head CHB .
M1 receives CID messages from CHB and CHA, and generates a new CID message
assigning an incorrect value to the field hop count, i.e., hop count is set to two. Thus,
all nodes at distance greater or equal to four hops (nodes 2 and 3) process the message
and incorrectly join CHA. Notice that the lowest value that can be used to reinitialize
the field hop count is two because CID messages with field hop count equal to one are
generated exclusively by the cluster heads. Additionally, we consider that the attacker
only has one interface, it can not impersonate a cluster head and it only modifies the
hop count value. In the following section, we present our proposed solution to handle
this problem.
5 Handling the Attack with the use of Hash Chains
We describe in this section a security improvement over HOLSR based on the use of
hash chains [13]. Authentication and integrity is achieved by using hash key chains. For
instance, in [10], Lamport proposes a method of user password authentication based on
a secure one-way hash function. We do not attempt to address authentication, but the
integrity of the messages. A one-way hash chain is based on a one-way hash function h
that is applied n times to a unique value x. Hash functions are relatively easy to compute
and can be applied to a block of data of any size.
A hash function can be applied to a block of data of any size and produce a fixed-
length output. According to [13], a strong one-way hash function h must have the fol-
lowing properties:
1. The one-way property implies that for any given value h(x), it is infeasible to find
the value of x.
2. The weak collision resistance property implies that for any given block x, it is
computationally infeasible to find y 6= x such that h(x) = h(y).
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b) Incorrect CID message propagation, decreasing the hop count value.
Fig. 4. CID messages.
3. The strong collision resistance property implies that it is computationally infeasi-
ble to find a pair (x, y) such that h(x) = h(y).
These properties are explained in detail in [13]. Our scheme prevents the attack pre-
sented in Section 4 while avoiding the use of computationally expensive cryptographic
operations. We use the following notation:
– sj : is a random value (i.e., a nonce) generated and known exclusively by the cluster
head CHj .
– h(x): is a strong one-way hash function applied to x.
– hn(x): is a hash chain constructed by applying n times the hash function h to x,
hn(x) = h(...h(h(x))).
– t: is the maximum number of times that a hash function is applied to x.
– Maxj : is the value obtained by applying t times the hash function to a nonce sj ,
Maxj = h
t(sj).
– i: is the distance in hops between the receiver and a cluster head.
Consider that the hash function h(x) and the value of t are known by all nodes in the
network. For our purposes, we suppose that the malicious attacker is not able of generat-
ing a valid nonce sj . Algorithm HASH-CHAINED_CID_DISSEMINATION (henceforth
HCCD for brevity) formalizes our proposal.
ALGORITHM: HCCD
1. A cluster head (CHj) generates a random number sj , i.e., a nonce.
2. CHj sets the field i = 1.
3. CHj calculates the valueMaxj = h
t(sj).
4. CHj generates the CID message:< Maxj , h
i(sj), i >.
5. The receiver node verifies that the sender node is i-hops away by applying the following
criteria:
– IfMaxj = h
t−i(hi(sj)), then the CID message is valid.
– Else, the receiver node discards the CID message.
6. If the CID message is valid, then the receiver node generates a new CID message
with the hop count increased by one and applying the hash function to hi(sj):
< Maxj , h(h
i(sj)), i+ 1 >.
Algorithm HCCD works as follows: firstly, a valid cluster head (CHj) generates a
random number sj , i.e., a nonce that is only known by the originator of the message.
Then, it initializes the hop count field i equal to one and computes the Maxj value
by applying t times the hash function h(x) to the nonce sj , such as Maxj is equal to
ht(sj). We assume that Maxj and the value of t are known by all the nodes in the
network during the execution of the protocol. Additionally, CHj applies i times the
hash function to sj , to obtain h
i(sj). Then, CHj generates a CID message with the
fields: < Maxj , h
i(sj), i >. The receiver node verifies that the CID message is valid
by applying t−i times the hash function to hi(sj) and comparing the result withMaxj .
Therefore, if Maxj is equal to h
t−i(hi(sj)), then the hop count value i has not been
altered and the received CIDmessage is valid. Finally, the receiver node joinsCHj until
it receives a CID message from a different cluster head with a lower hop count value. In
the mean time, the receiver node generates periodically CID messages announcing its
cluster head and the hop count distance to reach it, i.e., < Maxj , h(h
i(sj)), i+ 1 >.
Theorem 1 Given a HOLSR network applying the algorithm HCCD for the dissem-
ination of CID messages, such that malicious nodes in the network are not able of
generating a valid nonce s, h is a strong one-way hash function, i is the distance in
hops to reach a cluster head j andMaxj is a value obtained by applying t times h to
the nonce sj . Then algorithm HCCD guarantees that a malicious node cannot generate
a valid CID message with a hop count value k 6= i, such thatMaxj = h
t−k(hi(sj)).
Proof According to algorithm HCCD , Maxj = h
t(sj) and a CID message is valid
if Maxj = h
t−i(hi(sj)). Then, let us assume that there exists a value k 6= i such
that Maxj = h
t−k(hi(sj)). Thus, h
t(sj) = h
t−k(hi(sj)). Then, function h does not
meet the weak collision resistance property of strong one-way hash functions due to
ht−k(hi(sj)) and h
t−i(hi(sj)) are both equal to Maxj . Therefore, h
t(sj) is equal to
ht−k(hi(sj)) only if k is equal to i.

6 Results and Simulations Setup
In this section, we describe the experiments and results after assessing the effectiveness
of our proposed countermeasure to the cluster formation attack presented in Section 4.
We conducted our experiments using the NS-3 simulator [5], version 3.9. We modified
the original OLSR code developed by Ros and Carneiro to implement the hierarchical
approach (i.e., HOLSR), attack, and countermeasure described in Section 5. We tested
our algorithm in an HOLSR network with two levels, 200 nodes in the first level with
only one interface and four nodes with up to two interfaces (i.e., cluster heads). The
transmission range for nodes in the first level and second level is 120 m and 500 m
respectively. Nodes at the first level are placed following a uniform distribution in an
area of 1000 m by 1000 m. We assume that the administrator of the network can decide
the best criteria to distribute the cluster heads. Thus, we divide our scenario in four
quadrants and place a cluster head in the center of each of them. We also assume that
the malicious node knows the position of the cluster heads and sets itself in the border
of two different clusters to maximize the impact of an attack. We also assume that the
malicious nodes do not collude to perform an attack, no data traffic is generated and all
the scenarios are static.
In an ideal scenario, the number of nodes per cluster must be equally balanced.
However, due to the position of the nodes in the network this is not always possible.
Additionally, the presence of misbehaving nodes may disproportionately increase the
imbalance of the number of nodes per cluster. We compute the average of the standard
(a) σ ≤ 5 (b) 5 < σ ≤ 7
(c) 7 < σ ≤ 10 (d) 10 < σ
Fig. 5. Standard deviation of the average number of nodes per cluster testing different HOLSR
networks with up to five malicious nodes and applying algorithm HCCD .
deviation of the number of nodes per cluster with up to five malicious nodes launching
the cluster formation attack. Then, we compare the average of the standard deviation
of the number of nodes per cluster on a series of simulated HOLSR networks without
protection and the average of the standard deviation of the number of nodes per cluster
but applying algorithm HCCD . We use the standard deviation (σ) as a measure of
dispersion. The standard deviation is computed with the formula: σ =
√P
(xj−X¯)2
NCH
and expressed in the same units as the data, where xj is equal to the number of nodes in
the cluster j, X¯ is the average of nodes per cluster, i.e., total number of nodes (n) over
the number of clusters (NCH ). In our experiments, the standard deviation formula can
be simplified as follows: σ =
√P
(xi−50)2
4 . Fig. 5 shows how the CID attack affects
the average of the standard deviation of 100 experiments with different topologies and
90% confidence interval.
To present our results, we consider two factors that affect the distribution of nodes
per cluster: the network topology and the presence of malicious nodes. Thus, Fig. 5(a)
shows the experiments where σ ≤ 5, this means that the distribution of nodes per cluster
in the network is relatively balanced when there is no malicious nodes. Fig. 5(b) shows
the experiments where the distribution of nodes per cluster is less balanced due to the
network topology, i.e., 5 < σ ≤ 7, Fig. 5(c) shows the experiments where 7 < σ ≤ 10,
and Fig. 5(d) shows the experiments where 10 < σ. In each case, the first column
shows the average of the standard deviation with malicious nodes and implementing
algorithm HCCD . Therefore, the distribution of the nodes per cluster is affected only
by the network topology. The second column represents the average of the standard
deviation with malicious nodes but without applying our algorithm. Notice that the
average of the standard deviation and size of the confidence interval increase because
the number of nodes per cluster is less balanced due to the network topology plus the
effect of the attack.
7 Related Work
In this paper, we reviewed the cluster formation phase in HOLSR networks, however
other hierarchical approaches based on the OLSR protocol are also vulnerable during
the cluster formation stage, for instance: cluster OLSR (C-OLSR) [12] proposed by
Ros et al. assumes that a cluster formation mechanism has been executed, nevertheless
any security measures during this stage are proposed. The Multi-level OLSR Routing
using the Host and Network Association (HNA) messages Extension (MORHE) [15]
presented by Voorhean et al. does not specify any secure cluster formation mechanism
therefore like C-OLSR, the cluster formation stage is vulnerable to malicious attacks.
A tree-based logical topology [3, 2] to provide hierarchical routing is presented by
Baccelli, this approach implements Branchmessages to form and maintain a tree-based
structure. With a Branch message a node specifies information such as its identity (the
NodeID field), the tree where it belongs to (the TreeID field) and its parent in the tree
(the ParentID field). Additionally, the Depth field indicates the distance of the node
to the root. This approach does not propose any security measure to protect the in-
tegrity of Branch messages, so an attacker can easily alter the value of the Depth field
in Branch messages. A hierarchical approach similar to HOLSR which uses HNA mes-
sages instead of HTC messages for inter-cluster communication is proposed by Arce
et al. in [1]. Like HOLSR, cluster heads are predefined then is not necessary a cluster
head selection algorithm, however a cluster formation mechanism is needed. Therefore,
any strategy that uses the distance in hops as the main parameter to invite other nodes
to join a particular cluster head will be affected by the attack presented in this paper.
In [6], Hong et al., present a solution to secure OLSR (SOLSR). Authors present a
wormhole detective mechanism and authentication to strengthen the neighbor relation-
ship establishment. Thus, they use digital signature to ensure the non-mutable fields
and hash chains to secure Hop Count and TTL fields. Their solution is similar to our
proposed algorithm, however it is implemented in flat OLSR to protect only standard
control traffic messages. Kush and Hwang, present in [9] a mechanism based in hash
chains to secure AODV. Then Hashing is done for route request and reply messages to
achieve complete security in terms of availability, integrity and authentication, minimal
overhead, network performance in terms of throughput and node mobility. Similarly,
Hu et al., [7] propose a hashing mechanism to secure distance vector routing protocols.
8 Conclusion
HOLSR has been designed to improve scalability in MANETs. However, the proto-
col has been designed without security countermeasures. In this paper, we propose a
method to protect the cluster formation stage in HOLSR networks. Our mechanism
prevents an attacker from maliciously altering the hop count field in CID messages.
Thus, we present an algorithm based on hash chains that allows to detect and discard
invalid CID messages. Our experiments show that the distribution of nodes is less bal-
anced when the hop count in CID messages is maliciously altered. We also show that
we can prevent this kind of attacks by applying our proposed algorithm. Notice that our
mechanism, can be also applied in other hierarchical routing protocols for MANETs
that utilize mutable information such as the hop count or TTL fields to organize the
network in clusters.
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